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The Existence and Persistence of the Pay-per-use 
Bias in Car Sharing Services 
 




A key benefit of using car sharing services (relative to car ownership) is that they are more 
cost effective. Car sharing firms offer a menu of pricing plans to make this happen. The 
two most common plans are flat-rate and pay-per-use pricing. However, little is known 
about how consumers choose among these pricing plans. In this study, we analyze 
consumers’ choices between pay-per-use and flat-rate pricing using data from a car sharing 
provider in a large European city. We show that over 40% of customers make nonoptimal 
pricing plan choices (i.e., they do not choose the cost minimizing plan). In contrast to 
previous research, we find a prevalent and time-persistent pay-per-use bias; i.e., we find 
little evidence that consumers “learn”. We propose three potential explanations for the 
existence and persistence of this bias. First, we suggest that customers underestimate their 
usage. Second, we propose that customers have a preference for flexibility, leading them to 
pay more. Finally, we show that the physical context, such as weather, increases the 
likelihood of a pay-per-use bias. We suggest that the pay-per-use bias may be the prevalent 
tariff choice bias in the Sharing Economy. 
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The so-called “Sharing Economy” that offers consumers flexible access over the 
ownership of goods is characterized by substantial and increasing economic importance – 
for example, Uber (ride sharing) and Airbnb (hospitality) are valued at $72bn (Price, 2018) 
and $31bn, respectively (Heathman, 2017). While ride sharing services have been active 
for quite a while now, car sharing services are expected to yield double-digit growth in the 
US until 2024 (Gerrard, 2017). Ride and car sharing services can be largely beneficial to 
society via traffic reduction, decreased demand for parking (Conner-Simons, 2017; Kiron, 
2013) and/or decreased transportation costs for consumers. This decreased transportation 
cost is achieved through two types of pricing plans – flat-rate and pay-per-use pricing. 
Previous research in other contexts has demonstrated that consumers are not particularly 
good at making optimal pricing decisions under these plans. Therefore, and due to the 
novelty of ride sharing services, it is likely that consumers make “errors” when choosing a 
tariff related to their consumption, leading to tariff choice bias(es). 
Current research indicates that the emergence of the Sharing Economy fundamentally 
changes consumers’ consumption patterns (Zervas, Proserpio, & Byers, 2017). Although 
sharing and owning can be seen as substitutes, consumers’ motives for using a sharing 
service often differ from those of owning (Lamberton & Rose, 2012). Specific 
characteristics of sharing services like flexibility and convenience might yield bias patterns 
that differ from the well-documented and prevalent flat-rate bias (e.g., DellaVigna & 
Malmendier, 2006; Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006). For example, a preference for flexibility 
might induce consumers to choose the pay-per-use option too often so they do not have to 
commit to the less flexible flat-rate option, leading to a pay-per-use bias (Krämer & 
Wiewiorra, 2012). Thus, it is unclear, if such biases exist, which tariff choice bias(es) 
might occur in the sharing context. 
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Therefore, the goal of this paper is to analyze consumers’ pricing decisions and biases in a 
sharing context and to compare and contrast our results to previous research on tariff 
choice biases. Given that the Sharing Economy is growing rapidly and there is relatively 
little research on the behavior of consumers, firms, and platforms, our findings are likely to 
be timely and relevant for consumers, firms, and policy makers.2 From an academic point 
of view, our paper focuses on the demand-side behavior of buyers with respect to pricing 
and consumption, a hitherto unexplored aspect of the Sharing Economy in academic 
research. Thus, this study can be seen as contributing at the intersection of two streams of 
the literature – consumer behavior vis-à-vis the Sharing Economy and tariff choice biases 
in service contracts. 
Most studies on consumer behavior in the Sharing Economy focus on the reasons for 
participation, e.g., lowered overall cost due to on-demand access rather than ownership 
(Benoit, Baker, Bolton, Gruber, & Kandampully, 2017; Lamberton & Rose, 2012; Lawson, 
Gleim, Perren, & Hwang, 2016). This work also documents the role of nonprice-based 
factors leading to participation, e.g., flexibility, the ability to access goods that are 
desirable but out of (ownership) reach, the degree of substitutability and perceived product 
scarcity risk. With regard to price, most studies that focus on a sharing context focus on 
firm pricing behavior and its consequences. Zervas et al. (2017), for example, analyze the 
impact of Airbnb’s relatively cheap prices on the traditional hotel industry and show that 
Airbnb’s entry into the market significantly decreased the revenues of traditional hotels. 
Farajallah, Hammond, and Pénard (2019) study price setting by drivers on the ride sharing 
platform BlaBlaCar. Other papers focus on Uber and its surge pricing mechanism, which it 
uses to clear markets in the short-term (e.g., Hall, Kendrick, & Nosko, 2015). 
                                                          
2 We hereby address one of the research gaps identified by Kannan and Li (2017), namely consumer behavior 
with regard to price in the context of a new form of platform. 
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In terms of tariff research, studies analyzing the drivers of tariff choice (e.g., DellaVigna 
& Malmendier, 2006; Uhrich, Schumann, & Wangenheim, 2013) and studies investigating 
consumer behavior given a certain tariff choice (e.g., Iyengar, Jedidi, Essegaier, & 
Danaher, 2011; Leider & Şahin, 2014) can be differentiated. Several studies focusing on 
tariff choice show that consumers do not always pick the tariff that minimizes their billing 
rate (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006; Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006; Train, McFadden, & 
Ben-Akiva, 1987). Interestingly, most studies primarily observe a flat-rate bias, i.e., 
consumers choosing a flat rate, although they would save money under a pay-per-use tariff 
(DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006; Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006). Two explanations for this 
bias have been proposed. First, consumers are inherently subject to biases, leading them to 
commit errors. For example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) propose that 
overconfidence about future self-control is a main driver of the substantial flat-rate bias 
they observe (in the context of gym memberships). Second, consumers have a preference 
for a respective tariff and thereby deliberately choose the more expensive tariff. For 
example, Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) show that tariff preferences can also cause a flat-
rate bias because the payment is decoupled from consumption in flat-rate pricing. 
Using car sharing data from a firm offering these services in a large European city, we find 
that consumers overwhelmingly choose pay-per-use pricing and that 41% of these 
consumers exhibit a pay-per-use bias. More interestingly, this bias persists over time, even 
for heavy users. These findings are novel in that they are in direct contrast to previous 
findings on biases.3 We provide evidence for three possible explanations that are consistent 
with the existence and persistence of this bias: (1) demand underestimation, (2) preference 
                                                          
3 Miravete (2002) documents a pay-per-use bias using data from a tariff experiment conducted by South 
Central Bell. In contrast to our setting, the consumers in Miravete’s study learn after making an initial error 
in tariff choice and switch tariffs to minimize their monthly telephone bills. 
5 
 
for flexibility, and (3) the role of the physical context.4 Finally, we conduct robustness 
checks, discuss the boundary conditions of our analysis and results, and propose policy 
implications of our findings. 
2 Research Setting and Data 
2.1 Contextual Background 
We analyze panel data from a car sharing provider located in a large western European 
city. The car sharing provider operates a so-called “free-floating” business model; i.e., cars 
can be picked up and dropped off anywhere in a defined section of the city (this section 
comprises a large part of the overall area of the city). In terms of the competitive 
landscape, no other free-floating car sharing provider operates in the city in our 
observation period. Additional station-based car sharing providers similar to Zipcar exist. 
Station-based car sharing cars have to be picked up and dropped off at fixed parking 
spaces, and they are typically booked for longer trips. Beyond car sharing, the city has a 
well-developed network of public transportation. Moreover, multiple taxi and ride sharing 
providers like Uber operate in the city. 
The government offers car sharing customers an advantage in terms of parking. In addition 
to public parking spaces, cars can be parked in residential parking areas that are usually 
reserved for residents. Beyond parking, we are not aware of any other incentives that the 
government or employers might offer to promote the usage of car sharing. However, even 
if employers offered incentives, these would apply to only a very small fraction of the 
sample, since customers declared only 2.7% of trips in our sample as business trips5. 
                                                          
4 It is outside the scope of this paper to determine the most likely explanation– we leave that for future 
research. 
5 Based on a total sample of 81,482 individual trips. 
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2.2 Description of the Dataset 
The dataset contains trip-level data, including the starting and ending location of the trips 
and detailed information on the pricing plan choices. Cars are typically booked via a 
dedicated mobile app that provides customers with information on the location and 
distance to available cars and their characteristics (e.g., make and model). The data also 
include customer-level information, such as home address, age, and registration date. The 
data span 10 months in two distinct sample periods - February 2016 to July 2016 and 
November 2016 to February 2017. We use additional third-party data on aspects such as 
the weather, access to public transportation, and traffic patterns to augment the car sharing 
data. 
2.3 Pricing Plan Options 
The menu of pricing plans comprises two main choices. Customers can choose either a 
pay-per-use option, with a per-minute usage price, or one of two flat-rate options. The first 
flat-rate option is the purchase of an allowance of a certain number of minutes (at a price 
that is lower than the pay-per-use price) valid for 30 days (labeled “30-day package”). 
Once the allowance of minutes is used up, customers pay the pay-per-use price for 
additional minutes.6 The minimum allowance of minutes is 60 minutes in the first sample 
period and 125 minutes in the second sample period, as shown in Table 1. The second flat-
rate option is to buy an “hourly package” for one hour or multiple hours (that need to be 
used in a single block). With regard to the per-minute price, customers also have the option 
to book discounted cars (i.e., cars that have not been moved for a while) at a per-minute 
price that is lower than that for other cars. In addition, car-based price differentiation is 
introduced in our second sample period, i.e., different per-minute prices were charged for 
different car makes and models. The customers make pricing plan choices every time they 
                                                          




take a trip. Choices can be made via the dedicated app or via the menu on the display 
inside the car. For each trip, the customers must decide between the pay-per-use pricing 
option and one of the flat-rate options. However, if they book the 30-day package, it is 
valid for 30 days, and the customer will only have to make another plan choice once the 30 
days have passed. 
Period Price per minute 
30-day packages 
Length Total price  (price per min) 
Feb 16 - May 16 $0.52 60 min $28 ($0.47) 
  
 
100 min $46 ($0.46) 
  
 
200 min $88 ($0.44) 
  
 
400 min $172 ($0.43) 
Nov 16 - Feb 17 $0.44 to $0.52* 125 min $43 ($0.34) 
   250 min $83 ($0.33) 
   400 min $129 ($0.32) 
Table 1 Overview of Price-per-minute and 30-day Packages 
Note. Prices were converted to USD ($) using the mean conversion rate of the observation period. 
*Different prices for different car models. 
Prior to choosing a pricing plan and making a first trip, the customers must register for the 
service, including the payment of a registration fee of $13. To create awareness and to 
increase the sign-up numbers, the provider provided regular promotions that allowed 
customers to join the service for free. The provider additionally advertised the service via 
the following channels or media: TV, online, out-of-home campaigns in subway stations, 
flyers, an e-newsletter, and public relations. The provider did not promote a specific 
pricing plan but focused on increasing awareness of the service as a whole. 
2.4 Sample 
The data set comprises 81,482 individual trips. We exclude the months of June and July 
2016, as 30-day packages were not offered in these two months, leaving 8 months of 
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observation and 65,322 individual trips.7 To make the pricing plan choices comparable 
across customers, we aggregate all trip-level information (e.g., duration and cost of trip) to 
the monthly level, as is typical in this strand of the literature (e.g., DellaVigna 
& Malmendier, 2006). Our final sample consists of 13,975 month-customer combinations, 
with 5,441 unique customers being active in this period in at least one month. Not all 
customers were active during the first month of our observation period.8 Therefore, we 
carry out a cohort-based analysis. 
2.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics on trips and “errors”, the booking of 30-day 
packages and discounted cars, and related third-party data. The first row “months with 
trips” refers to all month-customer combinations, in which customers took at least one trip 
within that month. Next, are the descriptive statistics of total trips and minutes per month 
for which no flat-rate packages were used. The dummy variables for the 30-day package 
and discounted cars count all months in which these were booked. “Months with errors” 
refers to all months in which customers made an error (i.e., they could have saved money 
by choosing a flat-rate package). The “error rate per customer” indicates in how many 
months with trips customers made an error (e.g., if they took trips in four months and made 
an error in two months, their error rate would be 50%).9 More details on the supplementary 
data (weather, access to public transportation, and traffic) are discussed in part 4.2. 
                                                          
7 The average number of trips per customer is stable across months. Thus, the usage patterns in June and July 
do not differ from the months included in the observation period. Appendix 1 shows the number of trips per 
month within the observation period. 
8 Appendix 2 shows the number of new customer registrations per month, and Appendix 3 displays the 
number of active customers per month within the observation period. 
9 Alternative error calculations are provided in section 5 as robustness checks. 
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 No of obs Mean SD Min Max 
Months with trips (out of 8 possible) 13,975 2.52 1.77 1.00 8.00 
Trips per month without package 13,975 4.23 5.91 0.00 72.00 
Minutes per month without package 13,975 102.14 167.83 0.00 4943.00 
30-day package (DV) 13,975 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Discounted car (DV) 13,975 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
      
Months with errors (out of 8 
possible) 3,461 3.04 1.96 1.00 8.00 
Error rate per customer 5,441 0.18 0.31 0.00 1.00 
      
Precipitation (mm) 13,975 0.90 0.45 0.17 1.60 
Access to public transportation 10,314* 5.03 1.06 2.42 7.09 
Traffic (mean) 9,729* 469.05 252.77 151.69 2522.87 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Notes. DV indicates a dummy variable.  
* Fewer observations, as home address not available for all customers. For traffic, if distance btw. home 
location and air traffic counters > 2 km, set to missing.  
Precipitation data from https://www.wunderground.com. 
3 Pricing Plan Choices and Biases 
3.1 Analysis of Pricing Plan Choices 
We first analyze the pricing plan choices. At the trip level, the customers chose pay-per-
use pricing for 90.43% of the trips and the flat-rate option for 9.57% of the trips. Of the 
9.57% flat-rate choices, 5.57% were 30-day packages and 4% were hourly packages. Next, 
we examine whether tariff choice biases exist. 
3.2 Existence of Tariff Choice Biases 
Pay-per-use Bias 
To identify a pay-per-use bias, we analyze the total monthly minutes used and the amount 
of the bills paid by the customers to assess whether a 30-day package could have reduced 
the customers’ monthly bills. Thus, if a 30-day package would have reduced a customer’s 
bill, we define the month as a month with an “error.” Note that we focus on pay-per-use 
pricing; therefore, an “error” in the subsequent sections will refer to a pay-per-use bias. To 
express the regularity of errors in the pricing plan choices across customers, we form 
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different error categories at the customer level. We differentiate between customers that 
accumulated enough minutes for a 30-day package to be paying off and those that did not 
accumulate enough minutes. Customers that did not accumulate enough minutes for a 30-
day package to be paying off in any month with trips are in the category cannot be wrong. 
All other customers had enough minutes for a 30-day package to be paying off. We divide 
these customers into three groups depending on the regularity of their errors: never wrong: 
no error in any month with trips; sometimes wrong: error in some but not in all months 
with trips; and always wrong: error in every month with trips. 
As shown in Table 3, 32.97% of the customers are sometimes wrong and 7.65% are always 
wrong; i.e., they made an error in at least one of their months with trips. The remaining 
59% of the customers did not have enough minutes (cannot be wrong) or did not ever 
make an error (never wrong). Thus, the majority of the customers actually made rationally 
optimal choices by picking the pay-per-use option. However, looking at the corresponding 
months with trips shown in Table 3, the customers that exhibit a pay-per-use bias (in at 
least one of the months with trips) account for 61% (55.23% + 5.81%) of all months with 
trips. In sum, 41% of the customers with a pay-per-use bias (sometimes wrong or always 
wrong) account for more months with trips than the customers without this bias. 
Error category Customer level Months with trips 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Cannot be wrong 2,642 48.56 4,713 33.72 
Never wrong 589 10.83 732 5.24 
Sometimes wrong 1,794 32.97 7,718 55.23 
Always wrong 416 7.65 812 5.81 
Number of observations 5,441 13,975 
Table 3 Error Categories at the Customer Level  
 
Note: Shaded area = pay-per-use bias. 
 
Next, we focus on months with trips as the unit of analysis (rather than the customer level). 
We have the following error categories: no error possible: not enough minutes for a 30-day 
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package to be paying off in that month; no error: no error in that month; and error: error in 
that month.10 Table 4 shows that customers made an error in approximately 25% (24.77%) 
of months with trips. We compare these months with errors to approximately 16% 
(15.84%) of the months with no error to identify the characteristics and drivers of the pay-
per-use bias, which results in a sample of 5,675 months with trips. 
Error category Monthly level 
 Frequency Percent 
No error possible 8,300 59.39 
No error 2,214 15.84 
Error 3,461 24.77 
Number of observations 13,975 
Table 4 Error Categories at the Monthly Level 
Flat-rate Bias 
A flat-rate bias is also present but to a much smaller degree. We defined a month as having 
a flat-rate bias if the sum of the monthly minutes stayed below the breakeven number of 
minutes between the two options (54 min. for period 1 and 98 min. for period 2). Using 
this definition, the customers exhibited a flat-rate bias in 15% of the 5.77% of month-
customer combinations with 30-day packages, i.e., only in 0.87% of all month-customer 
combinations (N = 13,975).11 At the customer level, only 103 customers (1.89%) had a 
flat-rate bias compared to 2,210 customers that exhibited a pay-per-use bias (41% - 
sometimes wrong or always wrong). 
Given the low usage of the flat-rate tariff and the almost negligible presence of the flat-rate 
bias, we focus on the dominant tariff, pay-per-use, in our subsequent analysis. It is also 
important to note that, interestingly, we did not find both the flat-rate bias and pay-per-use 
                                                          
10 Unlike before, we do not have an error category “sometimes error” here since at the monthly level, we can 
only account for whether an error occurred in the respective month. The “sometimes error” category only 
applies to the individual level, at which individuals can have errors in certain months but not in other 
months. 
11 At the trip-level, 5.57% of the trips involved the use of 30-day packages (as noted in Section 3.1). 
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bias within the same customer. Thus, our analysis does not confound the type of bias 
within customers. 
4 Analysis of Pay-Per-Use Bias 
4.1 Economic Importance and Persistence of the Pay-Per-Use Bias 
Having demonstrated the existence and prevalence of the pay-per-use bias, we now 
analyze the average error size, its persistence, and differences between customer groups. 
The size of errors relative to bill payments shows the economic importance of the pay-per-
use bias. At the monthly level, customers with errors lose on average $9.65, which 
accounts for 23% of the average monthly bill payment. The maximum monthly missed 
savings is $649.95.12 Over all months with trips, customers with errors lose on average 
$24.67, which accounts for 12% of total bill payments. Here, the maximum loss is 
$3928.10. Thus, the loss, i.e., missed savings from choosing a nonoptimal pricing plan, can 
be quite substantial, especially for customers with high trip frequency over a long time 
period. 
Next, we analyze the persistence of the pay-per-use bias and whether the consumers learn 
to correct this bias over time, as has been documented in other contexts (Iyengar, Ansari, & 
Gupta, 2007; Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006; Miravete, 2002). For this analysis, we focus on 
customer cohorts, i.e., customers active in all months starting February 2016 and customers 
active only in February 2017.13 We illustrate our findings based on the cohort active in all 
eight months (comprising 1,199 customers and 5,230 corresponding months with trips). 
                                                          
12 The amounts vary considerably between low- and high-frequency customers. High-frequency customers 
(customers with on average of more than 3.7 trips per month) lose $16.14 per month on average, whereas 
low-frequency customers lose $3.64 on average.  
13 We define a cohort as customers being active in certain months of our observation period. However, unlike 
the conventional definition of a cohort, for our definition, the customers within one cohort did not all join 
the service at the same time. A probit regression at the user level shows that the longer a customer is 




Figure 1 Development of Errors and No Errors 
Figure 1 shows the development of the rates of errors and no errors within our sample 
period for this cohort.14 As Figure 1 shows, the error rate slightly decreases in the second 
sample period, but overall, it is rather stable; i.e., the pay-per-use bias persists over time. 
This suggests that in our sample period, the customers do not seem to learn. One 
possibility is that this finding is driven by infrequent customers. Frequent customers have 
more opportunities to assess their usage rate and corresponding cost. Thus, they should be 
more likely to detect the suboptimal pricing plan choices that they made and correct for 
them over time. We therefore look at the high-frequency customers (N = 1,355 customers; 
24.9%) – customers that take on average more than 3.7 trips per month15 – and find a very 
similar pattern, as shown in Figure 2 below.16 
                                                          
14 The absolute number of errors decreases in our second sample period from November 2016 to February 
2017. This effect mainly originates from a structural change in the offering of 30-day packages between the 
two periods. In the first sample period, the smallest 30-day package offered comprised 60 prepaid minutes. 
In the second sample period, the smallest 30-day package offered comprised 125 prepaid minutes. With a 
mean of 102 minutes without the flat-rate package per month, fewer customers accumulated sufficient 
minutes for a package to pay off in the second sample period than in the first sample period. 
15 High-frequency customers are above the 75th percentile of mean trips/month/user (i.e., > 3.7 
trips/month/user). Medium-frequency customers are above the 50th percentile to ≤ 75th percentile of mean 
trips/month/user (i.e., > 2 and ≤ 3.7 trips/month/user). 
16 The results are robust to other customer group formation criteria, e.g., the maximum number of trips per 

















Figure 2 Development of Errors and No Errors (High-frequency Customers) 
Figure 3 takes a closer look at different customer groups formed on the basis of the average 
number of trips per month (i.e., trip frequency) for the cohort active in all of the months of 
the sample period. We would expect that customers with a higher total trip frequency are 
more aware of their usage and thereby make fewer errors than other customers due to their 
experience. However, Figure 3 again shows the opposite result – that the most experienced 
customers (in terms of trip frequency) make the most errors. 
 
Figure 3 Different Customer Groups based on Trip Frequency 
Note: High-frequency customers are above the 75th percentile of mean trips/month/user.  






























4.2 Possible Explanations for the Pay-Per-Use Bias 
Next, we examine three possible explanations for the existence and persistence of the pay-
per-use bias: underestimation, the preference for flexibility, and the physical context. We 
do so by looking at the data patterns for each explanation individually. 
Underestimation 
The first potential explanation for the observed pay-per-use bias is that customers 
underestimate their usage (Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006; Uhrich et al., 2013). Since the pay-
per-use bias is persistent over time with little evidence that learning occurs, it seems 
plausible that underestimation is driven by overconfidence (a similar argument is made by 
Szymanowski & Gijsbrechts, 2013). As in Grubb and Osborne (2015), we can assume that 
the customers are overconfident because they underestimate the noise in their own 
forecasts about their future requirement for using car sharing. Specifically, the customers 
underestimate the variance in their future consumption. This is supported by the 
descriptive statistics of monthly trips without a package for different error categories (see 
Table 5).17 The variance in trips strongly increases between categories without errors and 
categories with errors. These results indicate that the customers in the categories that are 
sometimes wrong and always wrong are overconfident, as these customers underestimate 
the variance in their usage behavior and as a result, make more errors. 
Error category Mean Variance Median SD No. of obs 
Cannot be wrong 1.85 1.99 1 1.41 4,713 
Never wrong 1.37 7.20 1 2.68 732 
Sometimes wrong 5.31 41.09 3 6.41 7,718 
Always wrong 10.36 104.37 8 10.22 812 
Total 4.23 34.96 2 5.91 13,975 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics: Monthly Trips without Packages for Different Error Categories 
 
                                                          
17 Table 5 shows the statistics for all month–customer combinations. The results also hold for high-frequency 
customers only, when controlling for trip frequency. 
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To support this finding, we evaluate two alternative explanations that could also result in 
similar data patterns. First, the customers may simply lack the mental capacity to correctly 
predict their car sharing usage given multiple transportation alternatives and thus make 
errors. However, this is unlikely to be an issue because the accrued car sharing cost is 
made very transparent to customers. Customers receive emails with detailed cost 
overviews, and the invoices are also visible in the dedicated app at all times. Additionally, 
although alternatives to car sharing might exist, no other free-floating car sharing provider 
operated during the sample period in our location, and therefore, the usage prediction does 
not have to be divided between several free-floating providers. 
Second, it could be that customers with a pay-per-use bias are less price sensitive. To test 
this alternative, we analyze the number of discounted cars that the customers with and 
without errors booked. Discounted cars are usually cars in remote locations. The trip-level 
data show that customers have to walk longer distances to reach a discounted car than a 
nondiscounted car.18 Thus, opting for the cheaper but likely more distant car can be seen as 
a trade-off between price and distance and thereby an indicator of price sensitivity, given 
that nondiscounted cars are also available. Looking at high-frequency customers, we find 
that customers who exhibit a pay-per-use bias book slightly more discounted cars (in 17% 
of months with trips) than customers without a bias (in 14% of months with trips). This 
finding works against the argument that these customers are less price sensitive. 
Preference for Flexibility 
Second, as shown by the previous literature, customers can be guided by their preferences 
when choosing a pricing plan (e.g., Krämer & Wiewiorra, 2012; Lambrecht & Skiera, 
2006). For example, they might prefer a pricing plan because they value certain 
characteristics about it. In our context, we presume that customers may have a preference 
                                                          
18 Looking at distances < 1 km from the location of booking to the location of the reserved car, discounted 
cars are on average 86 m further away than the nondiscounted cars. 
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for flexibility. We analyze whether customers are primarily guided by their preference for 
flexibility rather than price, which increases their likelihood of making an error.19 
To analyze a possible preference for flexibility, we first calculate the premium that the 
customers paid on average per month for not committing to a flat rate but using the flexible 
pay-per-use option instead. The overall premium that the customers pay, on average, to 
stay flexible is 23%. When looking at only the second sample period, the average premium 
is 33%. As a result, the customers pay a considerable mark-up to avoid committing to a flat 
rate. The second indication of a preference for flexibility results from the comparison of 
errors made in the first and second sample periods. As indicated before, the minimum 30-
day package that could be booked in the first period was 60 minutes and 125 minutes in the 
second period. Figure 4 shows that the proportion of errors to no errors increases 
significantly (p <. 01) from 57% in the first period to 65% in the second period. This result 
is robust when we control for the cohort and trip frequency. The relative increase in errors 
in the second period is consistent with the argument that due to the higher commitment 
customers have to make in the second period (125 minutes instead of 60 minutes), they are 
even less willing to give up their flexibility and as a result, make more errors in the second 
period. 
Figure 4 Comparison of Errors to No Errors across Two Sample Periods 
                                                          
19 A potential alternative explanation may be risk aversion. However, risk averse consumers should choose 
the flat-rate instead of the pay-per-use rate. Further, given the moderate amount of money required for a car 
































Finally, we suggest that the physical context (i.e., the real-world environment) can also 
help explain the occurrence of a pay-per-use bias. As shown by several studies, the 
physical context can have a significant impact on consumer behavior when consumers use 
their mobile phones (e.g., Andrews, Luo, Fang, & Ghose, 2016; Kannan & Li, 2017). In 
our context, we propose that the two main contextual factors are weather and home 
location. To measure the weather, we use the mean monthly level of precipitation as this is 
likely to affect the use of car sharing. As seen from the panel probit estimation displayed in 
Table 6, when we control for trips within these months, the customers made more errors in 
months with, on average, higher levels of precipitation than they did in months with 
smaller levels of precipitation. This suggests that weather, measured here by precipitation, 




Parameter SE 0 = No error, 
1 = Error 
Precipitation (mean month) 0.204*** (0.067) 
Access to public transportation -0.107*** (0.040) 
Traffic (mean) -4.62×10-4*** (1.76×10-4) 
   
Roundtrips per month -0.035* (0.018) 
Total trips per month 0.081*** (0.006) 
Period 0.130** (0.059) 
Southeast region -0.083 (0.399) 
Northwest region -0.188 (0.407) 
Southwest region 0.040 (0.400) 
Northeast region -0.210 (0.536) 
   
Constant 0.432 (0.450) 
   
Observations 3,458  
Number of customers 1,610  
Table 6 Panel Probit Regression Analysis of Physical Context 
 
Notes. Standard errors appear in parentheses. The number of 
observations does not equal 5,675 because the home location is not 
available for all customers. 
The fifth region, which is the baseline, is the region surrounding the 
business area. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The second factor we look at is the customer’s home location with regard to surrounding 
mobility options, specifically, access to public transportation20 and traffic patterns. As 
again depicted in Table 6, we find that the error likelihood is higher when the degree of 
access to public transportation is low than when public transportation is more accessible. 
To support the previous finding that home location matters, we also analyze the impact of 
traffic in the vicinity of the home location. We match the location of 17 traffic counters 
with the customers’ home locations and add average traffic data for the sample period.21 
Although we identify only a minor effect, Table 6 shows that the error likelihood is again 
                                                          
20 The data on access to public transportation accurately measure the access to public transportation, taking 
into account walk access time and service availability. It is reported on an area level, where each area was 
given an average score out of 8, where 8 is the highest level of accessibility.  
21 This analysis was only carried out for customers living within the operational area of the car sharing 
provider, as we only have access to data for traffic counters within this area.  
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slightly higher when there is less traffic in the vicinity of the home location than when 
there is more traffic. 
Among other controls, Table 6 includes “roundtrips per month”, representing trips that 
start and end at approximately the same location (within a 500 m radius).22 This indicates 
that the error likelihood is higher when there are fewer roundtrips per month (p =. 055). 
Assuming that roundtrips are planned trips, as the return journey is also taken into account, 
one could argue that the error likelihood is higher when customers make more unplanned 
trips, indicating that the predictability of trips is lower for these customers than others. 
To interpret the presented effects of the physical context, we draw on the unpredictability 
of trips and the resulting underestimation of usage, as illustrated before. Weather in general 
and in particular, the number of days with rain in a month, are rather unpredictable. We 
assume that the customers use car sharing more often when it is raining than on days when 
it does not rain and that they make more unplanned trips when it is raining. In terms of 
public transportation, we propose that having limited access to public transportation is 
positively correlated with the likelihood of using other mobility options more often than 
those who have good access to public transportation and thereby the likelihood of using car 
sharing. The amount of traffic may affect how often the customers use care sharing – they 
may be more likely to use car sharing when there is less traffic than when there is more 
traffic. We propose that all these context factors (i.e., rain, less access to public 
transportation, and less traffic) increase the uncertainty as to which mode of transportation 
is used and how often it is used, which probably leads customers to underestimate their 
usage, which increases the error likelihood. 
                                                          
22 “Roundtrips per month” and “total trips per month” are correlated at .51. However, excluding “roundtrips 
per month” hardly changes the results, as Appendix 4 shows. 
21 
 
4.3 Additional Survey 
To validate the possible explanations for the observed pay-per-use bias, we conducted an 
additional survey (see Appendix 5). We recruited 120 participants in the country in which 
our data originated (39.17% female, Mage = 31.52 years, SD = 10.33 years) from an online 
crowdsourcing platform where participants completed a web-based survey in exchange for 
a fixed fee. 
We asked the participants to rate different items related to possible reasons for the 
observed pay-per-use bias, namely, underestimation, mental capacity, price sensitivity, 
flexibility, and the physical context, using 7-point scales (1 = not difficult at all – 7 = very 
difficult). The results provide additional support for the possible explanations previously 
described (see Table A2 in Appendix 5). Starting with underestimation, the results indicate 
that the customers might not be aware of their underestimation. However, we find support 
for our argument that underestimation may be driven by overconfidence and the fact that 
customers underestimate the variance in their future consumption. Moving to alternative 
explanations, the survey supports our claim that the lack of mental capacity does not 
explain this underestimation. Regarding flexibility, all items are highly significant in a test 
against the scale mean and demonstrate the highest means across all explanations. This 
emphasizes that the preference for flexibility is a strong driver of the pay-per-use bias. 
Finally, the different items with regard to the physical context (related to the weather, 
traffic, and access to public transportation) are also significant, providing additional 
support for these explanations. 
To analyze the potential relationships among the different possible explanations, we 
examine the correlations among the different constructs (see Table A3 in Appendix 5). 
Several of these correlations support our prior arguments. For example, we argue that the 
influence of the physical context leads to the underestimation of usage, which is also 
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reflected in the positive correlation between the physical context and underestimation 
(0.25, p <. 01). Overall, underestimation, flexibility, and the physical context are all 
positively correlated. This supports the conclusion that all three explanations are likely to 
occur together. 
5 Robustness Checks 
Alternative Error Calculations 
The underlying approach we use for the error calculation is to calculate the errors “ex 
post”, thereby following the typical approach used in the tariff choice literature (e.g., 
DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006). As a result, we observe customer behavior and the 
resulting cost at the end of each month and we evaluate whether a different pricing plan 
(i.e., a 30-day package) would have been less expensive for the respective month or not. 
One could argue that the customers do not have perfect foresight and that an error 
calculation should take an “ex ante” approach based on the expected cost. Therefore, to 
ensure that our error calculation is robust, we conduct alternative error calculations based 
on measures of the expected cost. We analyze five different measures of the expected cost: 
1) the cost of the mean number of minutes (calculated over the accrued minutes up to the 
current month), 2) the cost of last month, 3) the average of measures 1) and 2), 4) the cost 
of the first active month, and 5) the cost of the mean number of minutes of a peer customer 
group (depending on low, medium, and high trip frequency). To identify whether an error 
occurred, we compare the measure of the expected cost to the cost of the driven minutes 
without a savings package in the respective month. An error occurred if the cost of the 
monthly driven minutes was higher or 20% lower (assumed error margin) than the 
expected cost and if a 30-day package would have been less expensive in the respective 
month. The error percentages based on these five different measures are 28.12%, 26.06%, 
27.17%, 27.63%, and 26.50%, respectively (see Appendix 6 for more details). The 
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alternative error calculations vary slightly in size but are relatively similar. Our applied ex 
post calculation yields an error percentage of 24.77%. Given the similarity in the error 
percentages between the ex-ante and the ex-post calculations, we argue that the ex-post 
calculation is a valid (even at the lower bound) measure of the errors committed. 
In addition, we analyze whether the error percentage significantly changes if we base our 
calculations on time windows other than the currently underlying calendar months. For 
example, we analyze 30-day windows starting in the middle of one month (e.g., Feb 16) 
and ending in the middle of the following month (Mar 16). We compare the error 
percentage based on our first proposed measure of the expected cost (the accrued mean 
minutes) for the different time windows, and the results show that the measure is slightly 
lower for the mid-to-mid months calculation (26.41%) than that for the calendar month 
calculation (28.12%). However, since the difference is rather small, we suggest that our 
results are robust to changing the time window (for more details, see Appendix 7). 
Intermittent Activity 
Another robustness check focuses on “intermittent activity”, i.e., months with zero usage. 
Our current underlying sample consists of 13,975 month-customer combinations with 
5,441 unique customers being active in at least one month of the observation period. For 
the construction of this sample, we count only active months. Thus, if customers were 
active in one month (e.g., Feb 16) and again active in a month not adjacent to this month 
(e.g., May 16), we did not count the two inactive months in between (i.e., Mar 16 and Apr 
16). To analyze the robustness of our approach, we examine how our results would change 
if we included inactive months in our sample. 
We apply three different approaches (see Appendix 8). First, we include only intermittent 
inactive months (i.e., months between active months as in the example above), which 
changes the percentage of months with errors from the current value of 24.77% (based on 
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13,975 month-customer combinations) to 21.46% (based on 16,131 month-customer 
combinations). Second, we add all inactive months for all customers that were active in 
Feb 16, which changed the percentage of months with errors from the current value of 
24.77% to 19.97% (based on 8,493 month-customer combinations). Finally, we add all 
inactive months for all customers after their registration, which changes the percentage of 
months with errors from the current value of 24.77% to 10.17% (based on 32,445 month-
customer combinations). For the second and third approaches, we assume termination after 
four months, i.e., after customers had been inactive for half of our observation period. 
When comparing the error percentages across these three approaches, the error percentage 
slightly decreases for approaches one and two, but it remains comparable in size. Only 
when all inactive months are added, as in the third approach, the error percentage 
significantly decreases due to the large number of inactive months added in the first period. 
How much the error percentages change also depends on the underlying assumptions (e.g., 
termination). However, since the error percentages do not significantly differ for the first 
two approaches, we argue that our results are robust to including some intermittent activity 
(potentially constituting an upper bound). 
6 Conclusion 
We analyze consumers’ decisions among different pricing plans in a car sharing context. 
We observe that pay-per-use is the dominant pricing plan, and we show that more than 
40% of the customers exhibit a pay-per-use bias that is persistent over time. We propose 
three possible explanations: The first explanation is the underestimation of usage, likely 
driven by overconfidence. The second explanation is that customers may be primarily 
guided by their preference for flexibility. As a consequence, the customers pay, on 
average, a premium of 23% for this flexibility. Third, we suggest that physical factors, 
specifically weather and the home location, help explain the occurrence of a pay-per-use 
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bias. The error likelihood increases as the average level of precipitation increases and 
decreases as access to public transportation and the level of traffic decrease. 
Our results suggest that a considerable proportion of car sharing customers make errors in 
their pricing plan decisions, which could potentially prevent them from using or 
recommending car sharing services in the long term. Thus, policy makers should help 
consumers avoid underestimating their usage of car sharing services. This could, for 
example, be achieved by offering and promoting apps in which the usage and cost of 
different modes of transportation could be tracked. On a broader scale, policy makers 
should educate consumers about which modes of transportation are optimal for them given 
their preferences and home locations. This may be achieved by providing customers with 
decision aids facilitating the calculation of their costs and optimal mode of transportation 
choice. 
We believe that our findings are (to some extent) generalizable to other parts of the 
Sharing Economy. The choice between flat-rate and a pay-per-use options can be found in 
many other sharing industries, such as fashion, work spaces, and consumer electronics. 
Given that consumers' usage motivations and expectations in the Sharing Economy differ 
from those in traditional usage settings (e.g., car sharing vs. car buying), our findings of a 
more prevalent pay-per-use bias may apply across different Sharing Economy business 
models. We therefore expect that a pay-per-use bias may be the prevalent tariff choice bias 
in the Sharing Economy.23 
Our study has some limitations. First, we observe situations in which customers make a 
trip, but we do not know if or how often they considered using car sharing but then opted 
                                                          
23 It may be possible that the finding of the pay-per-use bias in this paper is related to the context of (public) 
transportation usage rather than the Sharing Economy setting (which is in the realm of transportation). 
However, this is unlikely as previous research documents that customers exhibit a flat-rate bias in the 
context of public transportation; see Uhrich et al. (2013). 
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for a different mode of transportation. Second, in a similar vein, we do not observe the 
competition (i.e., substitute modes of transportation, such as ride sharing or public 
transportation). Third, our dataset is limited to one city and one car sharing provider. 
Finally, we acknowledge that our results are descriptive as opposed to causal and that we 
cannot choose among the likely explanations that cause the bias. We hope that future 





Appendix 1 Number of Total Trips and Trips without Savings Package 
Figure A1 Number of Total Trips and Trips without Savings Package 
 
Appendix 2 Number of New Customer Registrations  
Figure A2 Number of New Customer Registrations (indexed, Dec 14 = 100%) 
 
Appendix 3 Number of Active Customers  
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Appendix 4 Panel Probit Regression Analysis  
 
Dependent variable: Parameter Parameter 
0 = No error, 
1 = Error 
S.E. S.E. 
   
Precipitation (mean month) 0.206*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0666) 
Access public transportation -0.103*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0395) 
Traffic (mean) -4.78×10-4*** -4.62×10-4*** 
 (1.76×10-4) (1.76×10-4) 
Roundtrips per month  -0.0354* 
  (0.0184) 
Total trips per month 0.0767*** 0.0810*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00574) 
South-east region -0.0933 -0.0834 
 (0.399) (0.399) 
North-west region -0.215 -0.188 
 (0.406) (0.407) 
South-west region 0.0273 0.0403 
 (0.400) (0.400) 
North-east region -0.242 -0.210 
 (0.536) (0.536) 
Period 0.125** 0.130** 
 (0.0592) (0.0593) 
Constant 0.422 0.432 
 (0.450) (0.450) 
   
Observations 3,458 3,458 
Number of customers 1,610 1,610 
 
Table A1 Panel Probit Regression Analysis on Physical Context 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations not equal to 5,675 as home 
location is not available for all customers. The fifth region as the benchmark is the region 
surrounding the business area. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5 Additional Survey  
Test vs. scale mean (4) 
Constructs Mean S.E. t-val 
Underestimation 
   U1 I underestimate my monthly usage. 4.09 0.15 0.61 
U2 The probability to use car sharing less than 125 minutes in 30 
days is higher than the probability to use car sharing more than 
125 minutes in 30 days. 
4.79*** 0.15 5.27 
U3 The risk of using car sharing less than 125 minutes is higher 
than the risk of using car sharing more than 125 minutes. 
4.51*** 0.17 3.04 
U4 I think that I am better than others at estimating my monthly car 
sharing costs. 
4.53*** 0.14 3.67 
     
Mental capacity    
M1 I find it difficult to calculate my monthly costs. 4.17 0.16 1.05 
M2 I find it difficult to estimate the variation in trips between 
months 4.88*** 0.14 6.17 
     
Price sensitivity    
P1 I do not care much about prices of car sharing services. 3.51 0.18 -2.77 
P2 It is too much trouble to compare prices of car sharing services. 4.02 0.17 0.10 
P3 It takes so long to figure out which pricing plan is better that the 
effort normally isn’t worth it. 
4.01 0.16 0.05 
P4 I do not pay much attention to discounts. 3.2*** 0.17 -4.65 
     
Flexibility    
F1 It bugs me when the 30-day package wasn’t profitable in a 
month. 5.23*** 0.14 9.05 
F2 It feels like a deficit when pay-per-use pricing would have been 
cheaper than the 30-day package in a month. 
4.98*** 0.14 7.21 
F3 It matters to me to max out the 30-day package. 5.23*** 0.14 8.88 
F4 I do not want to commit to a fixed amount of car sharing 
minutes at the beginning of the month. 
5.01*** 0.15 6.88 
F5 I want to remain flexible in what means of transport I use (e.g., 
car sharing, ride sharing, public transportation, taxi). 
5.32*** 0.13 10.03 
F6 I am willing to pay a little more in order to remain flexible. 5.11*** 0.12 9.28 
     
Physical context    
C1 I use car sharing more often when it is raining. However, it is 
difficult to predict the weather at the beginning of the month, 
which is why I prefer pay-per-use pricing. 
4.73*** 0.15 4.73 
C2 If in one month I expect many trips during peak hours with 
increased traffic, I prefer other modes of transport and refrain 
from booking a 30-day package. 
4.85*** 0.16 5.48 
C3 Since I am poorly connected to public transportation, I own a 
car. This prevents me from frequently using car sharing, which 
is why I prefer pay-per-use pricing. 
4.59*** 0.19 3.17 
Table A2 Additional Survey Single Items 












underestimation 1         
mental capacity 0.08 1       
price sensitivity 0.24*** 0.38*** 1     
flexibility 0.21** 0.10 -0.06 1   
physical context 0.25*** 0.21** 0.32*** 0.15* 1 
Table A3 Additional Survey Correlation Matrix 
Notes: N = 120, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Appendix 6 Alternative Error Calculations 
1) Minutes without package compared to accrued mean minutes (rolling mean of 
minutes in past months, first month excluded since no prior month exists, therefore N 
changes to 8,534) 
 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,649 66.19 
No error 485 10.99 
Error 2,400 28.12 
Number of observations 8,534 
Table A4 Error Calculation based on Cost of Mean Minutes 
 
 
2) Minutes without package compared to minutes of the last active month (first month 
excluded since no prior month exists, therefore N changes to 8,534) 
 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,649 66.19 
No error 661 7.75 
Error 2,224 26.06 
Number of observations 8,534 
Table A5 Error Calculation based on Cost of Last Month 
 
3) Average of mean accrued minutes (1) and minutes of the last active month (2)  
 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,649 66.19 
No error 566 6.63 
Error 2,319 27.17 
Number of observations 8,534 





4) Minutes without package compared to minutes of the first active month  
 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 9,484 67.86 
No error 630 4.51 
Error 3,861 27.63 
Number of observations 13,975 
Table A7 Error Calculation based on Cost of First Month 
 
5) Minutes without package compared to mean minutes of customer group (3 customer 
groups based on trip frequency/month/user) 
 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 9,484 67.86 
No error 787 5.63 
Error 3,704 26.50 
Number of observations 13,975 
Table A8 Error Calculation based on Cost of Mean Minutes of Peer Customer Group 
 
Appendix 7 Error Calculation for Mid- to-Mid-Month Time Window 
Minutes without package compared to accrued mean minutes (rolling mean of minutes in 
past months, first month excluded since no prior month exists, therefore N changes to 
8,534 and 8,227) 
Calendar months 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,649 66.19 
No error 485 10.99 
Error 2,400 28.12 
Number of observations 8,534 
Table A9 Error Calculation based on Cost of Mean Minutes – Calendar Months  
Mid-to-mid months 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,540 67.34 
No error 514 6.25 
Error 2,173 26.41 
Number of observations 8,227 




Minutes without package compared to minutes of the last active month (first month 
excluded since no prior month exists, therefore N changes to 8,534 and 8,227) 
Calendar months 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,649 66.19 
No error 661 7.75 
Error 2,224 26.06 
Number of observations 8,534 
Table A11 Error Calculation based on Cost of Last Month – Calendar Months  
Mid-to-mid months 
Error category Frequency Percent 
No error possible 5,540 67.34 
No error 647 7.86 
Error 2,040 24.80 
Number of observations 8,227 
Table A12 Error Calculation based on Cost of Last Month – Mid-to-Mid Months 
Appendix 8 Intermittent Activity 
1) Include intermittent months (only between active months) 
In this setting, there are no inactive months in the first month of our observation period 
(Feb 16), since we only “fill up” inactive months between active months within the 
observation period. Following this approach, the percentage of months with errors 
changes from currently 24.77% to 21.46%, as can be seen below (including new category 
“Not active”).  
Error category Frequency Percent 
Not active 2,156 13.37 
No error possible 8,300 51.45 
No error 2,214 13.73 
Error 3,461 21.46 
Number of observations 16,131 




Figure A4 Comparison of Errors to No Errors including Intermittent Activity 
2) Include inactive months for all customers active in the first month of the observation 
period (Feb 16) 
In this setting, all inactive months after Feb 16 are “filled up” for all customers that were 
active in Feb 16. We assumed termination after four inactive months. Following this 
approach, the percentage of months with errors changes from currently 24.77% to 
19.97%, as can be seen below (including new category “Not active”).  
Error category Frequency Percent 
Not active 3,263 38.42 
No error possible 2,733 32.18 
No error 801 9.43 
Error 1,696 19.97 
Number of observations 8,493 
Table A14 Errors Including Intermittent Activity after Feb 16 
 





































3) Include inactive months for all customers  
In this setting, all inactive months are “filled up” for all customers. We assumed 
termination after four inactive months. For customers that only registered after Feb 16, 
inactive months were naturally only added after their registration date. Following this 
approach, the percentage of months with errors changes from currently 24.77% to 
10.17%, as can be seen below (including new category “Not active”).  
Error category Frequency Percent 
Not active 19,589 60.38 
No error possible 7,664 23.62 
No error 1,893 5.83 
Error 3,299 10.17 
Number of observations 32,445 
Table A15 Errors Including Intermittent Activity for all Customers 
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